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NEA/AFT Merger in 1962: A Bit of History
In moving some files last week, I came across something I
wrote in late August, 1962. The subject was why I lost the
1962 election for the presidency of the AFT -- an election
that has disappeared from histories of the AFT.
Let me comment briefly on what I believe now would have
happened if I had been elected president of the AFT in 1962.
Bear in mind that in 1962 I had just published The
Future of Public Education, a widely read book that
advocated merger of the NEA and AFT on the basis of
terminating administrator membership in the NEA and
disaffiliation from the AFL-CIO. Inasmuch as my opposition
in the election emphasized my opposition to affiliation, it
is safe to say that the votes for and against me were a
rough referendum on affiliation in the AFT. On this basis,
we can say that approximately one-third of the Federation
was willing to disaffiliate, two-thirds were not. The latter
were mainly the large urban locals, in which affiliation
with a Central Trades and Labor Council meant something. The
one-third that supported me were largely suburban and other
small locals, in areas where there was no central trades and
labor organization to affiliate with.
Nine months before the election, the New York City local
(United Federation of Teachers) had won a decisive victory
over the NEA in a representation election in New York City.
The UFT had received substantial help from the AFL-CIO,
especially the Walter Reuther faction in the Federation.
There was great optimism that other victories could be
achieved following the strategy and tactics utilized in New
York City. Understandably, the UFT was concerned that my
election would undermine the assistance it was receiving
from the AFL-CIO. This is hindsight on my part, but the
conclusion is inescapable since AFL-CIO affiliation played a
significant role in Philadelphia, Boston, and other urban
districts in the Northeast.
In speculating (for that is all that can be done about
it) about the consequences of a Lieberman victory then, let
me emphasize that I do not now assert that my victory would
have improved or even changed U.S. education or the teacher
unions, or even the AFT. Of course, at the time, I had no
doubt that it would lead to basic change in the NEA and AFT,
but for reasons too lengthy to be included here, I do not
think so now, nor have I for at least two decades.
Furthermore, in this article, I draw no moral or ethical
conclusions about myself or my support or my opposition from
my defeat. My campaign was marred by strategic errors for
which I was responsible, directly or indirectly.
With the benefit of hindsight, my conclusion is that my
election would have split the AFT. Because the large city
AFT locals constituted a majority, I would have been a
one-term president, perhaps not even that. However, the
logic of the situation would have been for the small locals
supporting me to strike a deal with the NEA if and when it
became clear that disaffiliation with the AFL-CIO had no
immediate future in the AFT. This did not occur to me at the
time, but it seems like the natural progression of events
now.
What would have happened if the NEA had made a determined
effort to enroll various AFT locals en masse in the 1960s?
We will never know, but by 1965, I was convinced that the
NEA was losing its best opportunity to achieve a merger
outside the AFL-CIO umbrella. By that time, I was still a
supporter of teacher bargaining but was no longer a partisan
on merger issues; I was on good terms with many of the
leaders in both unions, and there was no reason for me to
antagonize either one. In the late 1970s, as my experience
with public sector bargaining greatly increased, I concluded
that public sector bargaining was undesirable public policy.
That ended my cordial relationships with various leaders in
both unions and led to my demonization by some. It is
amazing what motives are ascribed to a change of opinion
about the desirability of a public policy.
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