Building a Competitive Education Industry
A Weekly Column by Myron Lieberman

This spring we will see the publication of two books that discuss in detail the strategy and tactics of achieving universal school choice.  One of the two, John Merrifield's The School Choice Wars, was released in March; the other, Terry Moe's Schools, Vouchers, and the American Public will be released by the Brookings Institution in June.  Each book makes important contributions to the strategy and tactics of achieving school choice; considered jointly, as they should be, they will probably dominate the discussions of school choice strategy for years to come.

In this column, I shall discuss what is perhaps the main issue on which the two books disagree.  In doing so, I am reminded of the politician who said "I have friends on both sides of the issue, and I support my friends."   Both Merrifield and Moe have praised my work generously, hence I have no personal interest in favoring one over the other.  Initially, I planned to co-author the Merrifield book.  When I withdrew, Merrifield persevered on the manuscript, but there can be no question, as I am sure Merrifield would agree, that his book differs in some important respects from the book that I planned to co-author.  In contrast, I knew nothing about Moe's book until I received a review copy on April 12.  My comments here are devoted to the major strategic issue on which the authors appear to disagree; however, anyone with an interest in school choice should read both books.

Both Merrifield and Moe envision the ultimate goal as a universal voucher, that is, a voucher plan that enables all students to attend the public or private school of their choice, or at least not be precluded from attending schools of choice on account of economic reasons.  Merrifield is much more forthright about this objective than Moe, who advocates regulation (to ensure equity) that Merrifield would avoid if it were possible to do so.

The issue to be considered here relates to the strategy for achieving universal vouchers, with or without means testing or other provisions designed to promote equity.  Moe advocates supporting most if not all school choice plans, regardless of their limitations.  In his view, the biggest obstacle to a universal choice plan is that the American people don't know very much about vouchers; while they like the idea conceptually, they regard universal vouchers as a drastic change that would risk harming the public schools.  Much as most school choice advocates are reluctant to acknowledge the fact, most Americans are satisfied with their public schools.

Up to this point, Moe's analysis, which is supported by extensive polling data and teacher union tactics in voucher campaigns, will command widespread agreement; the strategy that Moe proposes will not.  Moe's argument is that the more that the American people become familiar with vouchers and see that they do not lead to the destruction of public schools, the more receptive they will be to expanding voucher plans.  For this reason, any voucher plan, no matter how limited, can be a plus for the school choice movement.  In other words, Moe's school choice strategy is to "let a thousand flowers bloom"; although Moe recognizes that the voucher experience will not always lead to favorable reactions, he believes that favorable reactions will usually result even from highly restricted choice plans.

Although I have not completely fleshed out the rationale for Moe's strategy, I will devote the rest of this column to Merrifield's criticisms of it.  My reason is that Moe's strategy already is the operative strategy in the school choice movement.  What Moe has done on this issue is to provide a plausible rationale for the idea that "every little bit helps." Indeed Moe's approval of current strategy says as much.  My reason for devoting more attention to Merrifield's criticisms is that criticism of the conventional wisdom is needed more than support for it.  Also, a comprehensive review of each book, let alone a review of both, in one column, is not feasible.

Merrifield asserts that Moe's strategy:

• Is a waste of valuable resources.
• Creates confusion about the goals of school choice (which for Merrifield are vouchers available to all children to any school of their choice, public or private.
• Renders school choice vulnerable to criticism when the limited choice plans result in inferior academic performance by private school pupils, as is inevitable given the restrictions on the plans that have been implemented up to this time.
• Is tactically unwise.  Although concessions will have to be made in the legislative process, Merrifield contends that choice advocates are conceding too much at the beginning of the process.
• Overlooks the fact that some school choice plans will severely weaken the opportunity to develop a competitive education industry.  For example, if denominational but not for-profit schools are eligible to enroll voucher students, the denominational schools will not participate in efforts to establish eligibility for the for-profit schools.  To do so would empower a strong competitor, but there would be no possibility of achieving the benefits of competition without participation by for-profit schools.

Moe has anticipated and rejected some of Merrifield's criticisms of the prevailing  incremental strategy; what I have said here is an inadequate basis for evaluating them. My point is that tough-minded books on voucher strategy and tactics are long overdue, but this spring we will have two that go a long way toward laying the important issues on the table.