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Building a Competitive Education Industry
A Weekly Column by Myron Lieberman

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Teacher Unions and Education Reform

Remarks by Dr. Myron Lieberman at the Wingspread Conference, "Everything You Wanted to Know About Teachers and Teaching," September 15-17, 2000, Racine, Wisconsin, sponsored by the Hechinger Institute on Education and the Media and the Johnson Foundation

Although I was pleasantly surprised to be invited to this seminar, I was very unhappy with its title: Everything You Wanted to Know About Teachers and Teaching. These are huge subject matters that fill libraries, and the idea of covering everything about them in a day and a half seminar seemed unrealistic. To make matters worse, the subject of teacher unions, which is related but different from teachers and teaching, was accorded an hour and 45 minutes total. This subject matter includes:

  • the legal framework of teacher unions and collective bargaining;
  • the scope of teacher bargaining;
  • the dynamics of bargaining;
  • impasse procedures;
  • teacher union political operations at the local, state, and national levels;
  • the governance of teacher unions;
  • union dynamics and caucuses;
  • the teacher union impact on education;
  • the costs of teacher unionization to teachers and to school districts;
  • teacher union control of the PTA; and
  • many other topics that I regard as important, but individually require more than a cursory discussion if you are to report on education realistically.

Consider just two facts about the teacher unions. With the possible exception of California, more delegates to the Democratic National Convention were members of the NEA/AFT than from any state in the union; around one ninth of all the delegates.

Second, NEA/AFT revenues at all levels probably exceed $1.3 billion a year, not including their PAC funds, foundations, and a host of special funds under their control. I cannot think of any other organization that plays such an important role in American politics that receives so little critical scrutiny from media.

What has been the impact of the NEA/AFT on educational reform? It is practically impossible to answer this question satisfactorily in a brief presentation because there is so little agreement on what are reforms and the extent to which they are being implemented. Meaningful discussions of the union impact on educational reform would have to be preceded by hours of definitional discussions with little or no likelihood of agreement among interested parties. For this reason, I shall use reform to mean increasing student achievement with the same level of resources or maintaining the levels of achievement with less resources, or some combination of these outcomes.

The typical treatment of reform is actually misleading. Almost invariably, it focuses on achievement without any reference to costs. For example, the teacher unions assert that reducing class size is a real reform, not an expensive, untested, divisive fad like vouchers. Next to teacher compensation, class size is the most significant factor affecting school budgets. Therefore, the question should be, how much improvement can we get for how much reduction in class size, and what will be the costs? This question is never answered because it is never raised -- a tremendous strategic advantage for the teacher unions.

The reason is simple enough. "Equalization" in education always means spending more on students or school districts receiving less than some predetermined average. Theoretically, we could achieve equalization by reducing the amounts spent at the top, but this is never what happens.

If you consider "reforms" solely in terms of achievement, it is always possible to argue honestly that more spending will bring about higher levels of achievement. The situation is very much like the decision on whether or not to spend more on advertising. Very few companies could not sell more of what they produce by increasing their advertising budget, but the practical question is how many more sales will result from a stipulated increase in the advertising budget. Similarly, the meaningful question on alleged reforms is not whether they result in higher levels of achievement, but what is the cost of the improvement, if any. Failure to raise this question is one of the reasons why discussions of educational reform are so misleading.

The union position is that the unions are a potent force for educational reform, but position assumes that school management, which has the responsibility for reform, must be forced to accept reforms by the union, which does not have this responsibility. Note the contrast with our experience in other industries; when foreign carmakers decided to make cars in the United States, they typically located in states where unions were weak; can anyone identify a carmaker who said, "I'm trying to find a location where the union is strong because it will force my company to be more productive?"

In asking about the union impact on reform, we are asking a question about organizations, not individuals or particular circumstances. In short, the question is really about the central tendencies of unions, and these tendencies are not invalidated by the outcome of negotiations in particular situations.

Basically, teacher unions, like unions generally, are political organizations. That is, formally or theoretically, union governance is based upon the votes of union members, not upon shares of stock or economic criteria. To understand the significance of this fact, consider union opposition to merit pay. According to the folklore of education, union opposition is due to the subjectivity of merit pay, and the likelihood that it will be used to reward bootlickers and discriminate against union activists. The real reasons for union opposition are quite different. In order for merit pay to be an effective incentive, the amounts have to be substantial. Teachers are not going to seek merit pay in the face of opposition from their fellow teachers if merit pay is only a few hundred dollars; however, as the amounts go up, the number of teachers who can receive merit pay will decline.

In contrast, the unions are in business to achieve benefits for everyone, not large benefits that can be awarded to only a few. Second, the union's interest is to have members believe that everything they get is due to the union's efforts; large rewards to a few teachers on the basis of their own efforts would weaken this union objective. Third, and most important, consider the inevitable outcome under merit pay. For every teacher who receives merit pay, nine others will request the union to file a grievance on their behalf, alleging that the grievant deserved merit pay more than the teachers who received it.

What does the union do now? Whatever it does, it will antagonize some members -- a no win situation for the union. To avoid this situation, the unions oppose merit pay.

I am not one who regards merit pay as a major issue, even though I am responsible to a significant extent for the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS), a disaster that deserves scrutiny instead of gullible acceptance by media. In any event, there is a major reform issue here that flies beneath the media radar screen. My reference is to the single salary schedule, especially to union opposition to salary differentials for teachers of difficult to staff positions, such as mathematics and science.

What the unions do is to cite the shortages of mathematics and science teachers as a reason to raise all teacher salaries. The problem is that with single salary schedules, school districts must pay more to all teachers in order to pay more to a few teachers for difficult to fill positions. This results in overpayments to most teachers and underpayments to the teachers in difficult to staff positions. To understand the damage this does, consider what would happen if a university sought to pay medical professors the same salary and benefits as journalism professors. In a very short time, the university would not have a medical school even if the university paid journalism professors much more than they could get on their own.

It is difficult to see how anyone can fail to recognize the negative effects of single salary schedules; they are the single greatest obstacle to recruitment of competent teachers in critically important subject areas, yet media have focused almost entirely on merit pay. Note again how political character of unions renders their anti-reform position inevitable. Mathematics and science teachers are a small minority among school district staff. Consequently, it would be virtually impossible to advocate a differential for mathematics and science teachers and maintain a leadership position in the teacher unions. Down the road, some unions may agree to such differentials as something that the school board was able to impose upon the union, but the possibility that a few school boards may be able to break away from a single salary schedule should not be allowed to obscure the impact of union determination to maintain such schedules.

Let me add one additional observation. The teacher unions constantly emphasize the importance of paying all teachers more. Many economists will agree, however, that the absence of high salaries -- very high salaries -- for a small number of teachers is a more important issue. Education does not attract the kind of individuals, such as Harvard dropout Bill Gates, who can raise the level of the entire industry. Why would any Bill Gates type enter the teaching profession, if we can call it that? The answer is that they would not, and do not, one of the reasons why most sectors of our economy far outstrip education in productivity growth.


Past Columns by Dr. Lieberman

Gays and Lesbians in Classrooms-September 11, 2000
Should Teacher Unions Organize All School District Employees?-August 28, 2000
The Fallout from the Bilingual Education Controversy-August 21, 2000
Senator Lieberman's Support for Vouchers-August 14, 2000
Education at the GOP Convention-August 7, 2000
No Union or Different Kind of Union?-July 31, 2000
Merit Pay Can't Provide The Incentives For Improvement-July 17, 2000
The NEA's Latest Party-July 10, 2000
How and Why the NEA Avoids the Union Label-July 3, 2000
How the NSBA Stifles Dissent-June 26, 2000
Teacher Representation in the Bargaining Law States-June 19, 2000
Should Teachers Affiliate with the AFL-CIO?-June 12, 2000
Vouchers, Polls, and Soundbites-June 6, 2000
Why the NEA/AFT Support and Oppose Privatization Simultaneously-May 30, 2000
Looking At School Choice In A New Light-May 19, 2000

 

See File

Education Policy Institute, PMB 294, 4401-A Connecticut Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20008-2322 202/244-7535, Fax 202/244-7584 http://www.educationpolicy.org, revised 9/18/00