• CHAPTER 7 -- NEA/AFT Merger: A Historical Perspective
  • New Business Items 1993-A and 1993-B: The 1993 convention background
  • The role of Albert Shanker

CHAPTER 7 -- NEA/AFT Merger: A Historical Perspective

In both the NEA and AFT, interest in merger talks has waxed and waned since 1960. In that year, Myron Lieberman published The Future of Public Education, a book that proposed merger on the basis of no affiliation with the AFL-CIO and the expulsion of administrators from the NEA. At the time, Lieberman believed that affiliation with the AFL-CIO was the major organizing obstacle to the AFT; also, that administrator membership in the NEA was incompatible with teacher bargaining, which he believed to be imminent (Lieberman, 1960).

Although some activists in both the NEA and AFT agreed with this analysis, they were not well organized in either union. During the 1960s and early 1970s the NEA could probably have forced a merger by cutting a deal with AFT leaders who were not enamored of affiliation with the AFL-CIO. There were a sizable number of such leaders; after all, despite having just published a book urging disaffiliation with the AFL-CIO and despite an inept campaign, Lieberman received one third of the votes for the AFT presidency at its 1962 convention.

In the early 1970s, the NEA might have achieved merger by offering inducements to AFT leaders to bring their locals with them if and when these leaders switched over to the NEA. To effectuate a merger, the strategy need not have been successful with all or even most AFT locals; only enough of them to force the others to the table to salvage what they could from a deteriorating situation. Although some of its strategists wanted to adopt this strategy, the NEA did not do so; instead it focused upon defeating AFT locals in representation elections. This strategy naturally led the NEA to portray the AFT and AFL-CIO as evil forces to be avoided at all costs, a posture the NEA is now trying to change with the advent of merger talks.

Merger talks did take place in 1973 and 1974, but they broke down very quickly, and the unions lapsed back into their combat modes (Selden, 1985). According to Selden, the talks ostensibly broke down over affiliation with the AFL-CIO and the guarantee of minority participation. Selden, however, believed that these might have been resolved if Shanker had not privately been opposed to merger. During the time in 1972-74 when the merger talks were going on, Shanker had amassed enough support in the AFT to replace Selden as president. In Selden's view, Shanker feared that merger would have forced Shanker to give up his control over the AFT and to take his chances in a newly merged organization in which his AFT supporters would be vastly outnumbered. Paradoxically, there was also a fear in some NEA quarters at the time that a merger would lead to a "Shanker takeover" of the merged organization. In this connection, it is interesting that Shanker tried to remove Selden from office as AFT president in 1973 for allegedly exceeding his authority in discussing merger with NEA leaders (Selden, 1985).

From time to time, however, mergers have taken place at the local level, usually on the basis of dual membership in the NEA and AFT and affiliation with the AFL-CIO. This solution did not attract much support and because of the costs involved, it is unlikely to be widely adopted in the 1990s. New York was the only state in which there was a merger at the state level, but the merger there did not survive the anti-merger sentiment that pervaded the NEA in the 1970s.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the long-time existence of rival unions competing for the same members is the exception, not the usual outcome in the labor movement. During the time when sophisticated leadership might have averted the organizational stalemate that eventually emerged, the NEA was a badly divided organization with an extremely diffuse governance structure. Survival, not principle, drove the NEA to embrace teacher bargaining; indeed, the NEA's initial response to AFT victories in representation elections was to establish an "urban project," in the naive belief that collective bargaining was an issue limited to urban areas. The NEA did not explicitly accept union status or terminology or philosophy until the window of opportunity to merge without affiliation had closed, and merger talks were the only way to achieve a unified teacher organization. Today, however, there is no practical difference between the two unions regarding the desirability of teacher bargaining. The extent to which affiliation with the AFL-CIO remains as an issue remains to be seen and is discussed later in this chapter.

New Business Items 1993-A and 1993-B: The 1993 convention background

The NEA's interest in merger and the possibility of a change in its position on affiliation with the AFL-CIO, was evident in New Business Items 1993-A and 1993-B, adopted by the Representative Assembly at the 1993 NEA convention.

New Business Items A and B were submitted to the Representative Assembly by the NEA's Board of Directors. The items were originally recommended by a Board of Directors Special Committee, which had been directed to review NEA policies on merger and report back to the board. When the Special Committee did so, the Board of Directors approved the report, including the recommendations that merger talks and moratoriums on merger talks at the state and local levels and on representation challenges be submitted to the 1993 Representative Assembly. The vote on the Board of Directors to do so foreshadowed the substantial majority that the items received in the Representative Assembly vote on July 2 (Geiger, 1993).

Significantly, there had been growing interest in merger talks in the NEA prior to the establishment of the Special Committee of the Board of Directors. In several states characterized by costly competition for bargaining rights and members, merger talks had been initiated or considered in recent years: Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, New Mexico, Florida, and California are among these states. In these states, NEA affiliates wanted to explore merger possibilities but were unable to do so because of the NEA's restrictions on affiliation with the AFL-CIO. The situation brought some pressure to bear on the NEA to avoid an organizational free for all in which its state affiliates might negotiate merger agreements that were not in the best interests of the national organization. At the 1993 NEA convention, a small group was opposed to merger except through a total AFT capitulation to the NEA; a larger group was predisposed to merger and to make significant concessions to achieve it; and a still larger group will undoubtedly be heavily influenced by the proposals and arguments that are submitted to the Representative Assembly in 1994. Of course, even the parties favoring merger do not support it regardless of the arrangements, but they are more likely to make concessions to bring it about.

On its face, the moratoriums on merger talks below the national level and on representation challenges appear only to recognize the fact that the NEA and AFT are firmly entrenched in their respective domains. The possibility of a few successful challenges by either union was deemed not worth the risk that such challenges might disrupt the merger talks. Even apart from this consideration, however, the two moratoriums are extremely significant. In effect, they centralize control of the merger talks in the national leadership of the two unions. (It is possible that other unions, especially unions of support personnel, will be involved in the talks, but because the critical issues are those dividing the AFT and NEA, our analysis will be limited to these two unions.) To be sure, the negotiating teams for the NEA and AFT will confer with their key constituencies during the talks; a great deal of emphasis was placed on this point during the debate in the Representative Assembly. NEA President Keith Geiger assured the delegates that there would be adequate communication between the NEA's team and various constituencies within the NEA. Nevertheless it should be noted that the moratoriums rule out initiatives by state or local affiliates in both unions. For this reason, the moratoriums place tremendous power in the national leadership of the two unions.

The debate preceding the vote on the merger talks was spirited but essentially irrelevant to the outcome. The proposals for merger talks had been disseminated over a month before the convention, and they were discussed in the various caucuses before the convention vote. It is unlikely that many votes were changed by the debate; clearly, the proponents, led by Geiger, who had just been reelected to a three year term as NEA president, were prepared to defeat maneuvers to block or weaken the merger talks. Or-ganized opposition to the talks emerged in state delegations from New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois, but it was clear at the outset of the debate that the opponents of the talks could not block them on a straight up and down vote. Although many delegates voted for the talks with reservations ("Why oppose talks with the AFT?"), many others felt that merger talks would develop a momentum of their own leading to a merger. In their view, voting for merger talks was tantamount to voting for merger. Some of this thinking was based upon the fact that the new business items authorizing the talks explicitly questioned NEA policies prohibiting affiliation with the AFL-CIO, a major obstacle to merger in the past.

Less than a week after the NEA authorized merger talks, the AFT held its annual convention on educational issues in Washington. Interestingly enough, the NEA's actions were a non-event at the AFT convention; the overwhelming majority of delegates seemed not to care, or even to know about the NEA's actions. Even AFT President Shanker disclaimed detailed prior knowledge or discussions with NEA leaders on merger issues; however, when asked how the NEA leaders could be so confident that the AFT would accept the moratoriums, Shanker conceded that he had indicated that the moratoriums would not be a problem. Obviously, the leaders in both unions have been very careful to avoid opposition to merger based on failure to follow proper organizational procedures. Whether or not they had reached any informal agreement before New Business Items 1993-A and 1993-B were adopted, they probably have some common reasons to believe the talks will be more productive than previous merger talks.

Teacher affiliation with the AFL-CIO is a major difference between the NEA and AFT; obviously, it is a major issue in the merger talks. In our view, the issue is a practical, not a moral or professional one. By "practi-cal," we mean that the issue will be resolved on the basis of whether teachers believe that they will be better off if affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Of course, the answer to this question does not necessarily answer the question of whether teacher affiliation with the AFL-CIO is in the public interest, or whether the public interest is or should be a factor in how the issue is resolved.

Although affiliation is a merger issue, affiliation or non-affiliation should not be grounds for opposing merger if one accords the highest priority to a unified teacher organization. That is, regardless of whether one favors or opposes affiliation, it should not be grounds for opposing merger if one's highest priority is a unified teacher union.

We do not believe that affiliation with the AFL-CIO will be a make or break issue in the merger talks. Our point is not that all teachers will be required to affiliate, or prohibited from doing so. Our thought is only that the issue will be resolved in a mutually satisfactory way in the merger talks. The resolution may be only a short-term one, but merger will not be held up over the issue.

Conceptually, there are at least two ways to approach the affiliation issue. One is to examine the AFL-CIO constitution to ascertain the implications of "affiliation," at least as they are evident from it. The other way is to analyze the arguments for and against affiliation without regard to the AFL-CIO constitution or any other document. In this case, however, both approaches lead to the same conclusions.

A perusal of its constitution reveals a surprising fact about affiliation with the AFL-CIO. Except for payment of per capita taxes (dues) to the AFL-CIO there does not appear to be any significant substantive commitment involved in affiliation with the Federation. Of course, there are seve-ral organizational requirements and procedures, such as the determination of voting strength at conventions and procedures for becoming affiliated, but there is no restriction on policy positions that can be adopted or taken. The AFL-CIO constitution does provide for the investigative and disciplinary procedures relating to corrupt affiliates, or to affiliates whose policies or activities "are consistently directed toward the advocacy, support, advancement or achievement of the program or of the purposes of the Communist Party, any fascist organization or other totalitarian movement" (Article 8, Section 7, AFL-CIO Constitution). It is unlikely that a significant number of NEA members would take exception to these provisions, at least to the extent of insisting that they be eliminated or amended as a condition of merger.

Despite the concerns over teacher union autonomy under affiliation, the AFL-CIO constitution emphasizes the autonomy of its constituent unions; its ability to act for all is much more problematic than any danger of infringing on the autonomy of an affiliated union. The following provisions illustrate this point:

The objects and principles of this Federation are:

. . . To preserve and maintain the integrity of each affiliated union in the organization to the end that each affiliate shall respect the established bargaining relationships of every other affiliate and that each affiliate shall refrain from raiding the established bargaining relationship of any other affiliate and, at the same time, to encourage the elimination of conflicting and duplicating organizations and jurisdictions through the process of voluntary agreement or voluntary merger in consultation with the appropriate officials of the Federation, to preserve, subject to the foregoing, the organizing jurisdiction of each affiliate.

. . . To safeguard the democratic character of the labor movement and to protect the autonomy of each affiliated national and international union (Article II, Section 8,11, AFL-CIO Constitution).

. . . The Federation shall be composed of: (1) national and international unions which are affiliated with, but are not subordinate to, or subject to the general direction and control of, the Federation . . . (Article III, Section 1, AFL-CIO Constitution).

The financial obligations of affiliation are significant but not especially onerous. AFT dues are $8.55 per month ($102.60 annually) for regular full-time teachers. State Federation dues vary but are almost always much less than state association dues in the NEA. Local dues also vary, but are comparable or even higher than local association dues in the NEA. Beginning in January 1993, each national affiliate of the AFL-CIO is obligated to pay 40 cents per month per member, payable on or before the 15th of the month for the preceding month. The per capita tax for members who are
not "regular members" or who "receive less than the full range of the union's representation services is two-thirds of the regular per capita to the nearest whole cent," or 26 cents per month per member. Under certain circumstances not likely to be applicable to the NEA, the AFL-CIO's Executive Council can raise the per capita one cent per member per month.

The 1993-94 NEA budget is based on the equivalent of 2,208,000 regular members. At $.40 per member per month, its annual financial obligation to the AFL-CIO would be $4.80 per member, or almost $10,600,000 annually. This figure does not include the per capita paid to local and state central labor bodies. These figures will vary, but would not be a major obstacle to merger.

The AFL-CIO was established on the basis that the economic interests of workers in various industries necessarily outweigh their conflicting or divergent interests. This is a fallacy sustained by faulty economics. For example, when the auto workers receive wage increases, the popular view is that their "employers" pay for them. Actually, the wage increases are passed on to car buyers in the form of higher prices, paid by the members of other unions in the AFL-CIO as well as by the public generally.

The counter argument is that the mutual assistance unions in the AFL-CIO receive outweighs the costs they inflict on each other. Thus the question is whether the union members give up more as consumers than they gain as producers through their affiliation with the AFL-CIO. It is not at all clear that the benefits outweigh the costs, at least all of the time to all of the unions in the AFL-CIO. The issue is really an empirical, not an ideological one. One can argue that the gains due to affiliation clearly outweigh the costs because parties outside the AFL-CIO, such as the unorganized, absorb most of the costs of the gains achieved through affiliation.

Nevertheless, there is a significant and growing conflict of interest between the public and private sector unions in the AFL-CIO. The private sector unions are more likely to be hurt by high taxes and government expenditures, whereas public sector unions are strongly opposed to limits on taxes and government expenditures (Troy, 1993). Of course, it might also be argued that affiliation is imperative precisely to avoid such a split in the labor movement.

The opponents of affiliation in the NEA fear that the AFL-CIO will restrict the NEA's independence or autonomy. As previously pointed out, this is about as likely as the NEA interfering with the autonomy or independence of the airline pilots or autoworkers, which is to say it is extremely unlikely. The basic issue is whether the teachers are willing to help other unions inflict higher costs on the rest of the population, including the disadvantaged, in exchange for the help these unions give the NEA to achieve its objectives. Many, perhaps most, teachers are willing to do so. The problem is that the teachers are being urged to accept affiliation on the basis of its benefits, while its real costs are totally ignored in the irrelevant debate over "autonomy" or "independence." The teachers might well conclude that the benefits are worth the real costs, including the cost of giving up their cherished belief that teachers are much concerned about the disadvantaged; the latter are the largest group disadvantaged by the AFL-CIO policies generally. In any event, affiliation is not a moral issue or one of high principle, as it is made out to be by partisans on both sides of the issue.

From a public interest point of view, teacher affiliation with the AFL-CIO would have some benefits. No one takes seriously the idea that unions of autoworkers or teamsters or restaurant workers, for example, exist to protect the consumers. The legal and practical role of unions is to advance the interests of their members, regardless of whether the unions label themselves "professional associations" or some other self-serving title. This is not a pejorative comment. People have the right to be represented by organizations that advance their interests, and most people belong to such organizations. Affiliation with the AFL-CIO would help to remove the veneer of dedication to children that still permeates NEA rhetoric and obscures clear thinking about public policies toward teacher unions.

In any event, the wording of the NEA resolutions on merger talks demonstrates NEA willingness to move away from rigid opposition to affiliation. Inasmuch as the NEA is not likely to impose affiliation on all of its state and local affiliates, affiliation is likely to be a state and/or local option. Such an option, however, is likely to be only an interim solution. Over time, the state organizations with mandatory affiliation will become a majority and be able to coerce or persuade the remaining state organizations to accept affiliation. This will happen when and if the pro-affiliation forces can require affiliation without substantial defections from the merged organization. In the meantime, anyone who opposes merger because affiliation with the AFL-CIO is mandatory, or because it is not mandatory, probably has an agenda that does not accord a high priority to an NEA/AFT merger.

In this connection, it is doubtful whether a large majority within the AFT strongly supports affiliation with the AFL-CIO; in our view, it is an open question whether rank and file AFT members care deeply about the issue, one way or the other. AFT members support affiliation with varying degrees of commitment, or tolerate it, but most probably would not require much persuasion or major concessions to change their position. Significantly, more than two years after proposing merger on the basis of no affiliation with the AFL-CIO and the exclusion of administrative personnel from the merged organization, Lieberman received one-third of the votes for AFT president at its 1962 national convention. In addition:

1. David Selden, AFT president before Shanker, was willing to move away from a rigid affiliation requirement in the 1974 merger talks. Selden wanted to propose an opt-out provision, whereby members of the merged organization would have the option not to have any of their dues go to the AFL-CIO. Because he was a lame duck president in a union that had come under Shanker's control, Selden was not able to make this offer to the NEA merger team (Selden, 1985).

2. Many AFT locals are in communities where there is no central trades and labor council affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Affiliation is a state and federal, but not local relationship in many of these communities.

3. Evidence from many sources supports the conclusion that the single most important factor keeping affiliation alive as an issue is Shanker's undeviating insistence upon it in a merger. Of course, affiliation must appeal to some in the AFT or Shanker could not sustain his commitment to it; in many cases, however, the office seekers in the AFT support affiliation out of political expediency, not principle or even organizational welfare. In saying this, we are not passing judgment on the merits, but on the support it has in the AFT. In the large urban centers, affiliation tends to be more useful than in the suburbs, but since the urban school districts are so influential in
the AFT, affiliation receives more support than it would according to membership sentiment.

At the 1993 NEA convention, the Illinois Education Association (IEA) raised several serious questions about the advisability of affiliation. For example, the IEA pointed out that most legislative activity affecting private sector unions is at the federal level, but the state level is the critical arena in education. Thus the IEA questioned the value of NEA affiliation with a predominantly private sector organization, especially in view of the fact that the state affiliates of the NEA are usually among the most effective lobbies in the state capitals. The IEA objections, however, failed to recognize the dramatic increase in public sector unions and decline in private sector ones; furthermore, its argument did not mention the possibility of federal legislation that would require state and local governments to bargain collectively, an objective of both the NEA and AFT.

The fact is that the private sector unions no longer overwhelmingly dominate the labor movement. Significantly, about 40 percent of public sector workers are organized, whereas the highest level of union penetration in the private sector was 36 percent in 1953. In 1992, less than 12 percent of private sector workers were unionized, a lower figure than was the case in 1929. If these trends continue, even at a slower pace, the strongest argument for affiliation will be the common interests of NEA members and the members of the AFL-CIO.

The IEA also pointed out that the NEA could affiliate without merger; however, the AFL-CIO, which does not want its constituent federations to compete against each other, is not likely to accept the NEA separately. AFL-CIO unions sometimes do compete for the same workers, but it is something to be avoided if at all possible. Separate affiliation would create internal problems for the AFL-CIO; for example, if the NEA supports ethnic quotas and the AFT opposes them, the AFL-CIO could get involved in controversies between the separate unions. With a single organization, the issue would have to be resolved before it reached the AFL-CIO.

The IEA analysis leaves the impression that affiliation is a mixed bag, which probably is the correct view of it from a teacher perspective. If affiliation is a mixed bag, however, merger should not be hostage to it. Granted, some principles are more important than unification in a single teacher organization. For instance, neither union would or should agree to a merger if certain ethnic groups were denied membership in the merged organization. The fact that the merged organization could and would eliminate the discrimination would not be justification for merger with this restriction, even if it were specifically stated to be in effect for only a short time.

It is difficult, however, to see justification for treating affiliation as this kind of an issue. Theoretically, it would be possible to propose disaffiliation immediately after a merged organization with affiliation comes into existence, but there are likely to be time limits before disaffiliation can be raised. It can be argued that it would be foolish to launch a new organization with an unresolved issue that will divide it from the outset, but how long should the moratorium on this issue be?

The role of Albert Shanker

The foregoing discussion highlights the role that AFT President Albert Shanker will play in the merger talks. Shanker is a vice-president of the AFL-CIO and a member of the Executive Council, its governing body. The AFL-CIO constitution requires that union representatives on the Executive Council must be one of the "principal officers" of the union. The phrase has never been defined, but in the past, there have only been two exceptions to the tradition of presidents only on the Executive Council. One was Shanker's acceptance as the 1st vice-president of the AFT. This was made possible only because Shanker had the strong support of AFL-CIO President George Meany, who supported Shanker's inclusion over the objections of several members of the Executive Council. One factor underlying the opposition to Shanker was the fear that allowing membership on the Executive Council to officers below the rank of president would or could lead to the ascendancy of rivals to the union presidents. It is interesting that Shanker was elected to the position of 1st vice-president of the AFT, a position specifically created to elevate him over the other AFT presidents and thus to strengthen his accession to the Executive Council (Troy, 1993, Selden, 1985).

Minimally, therefore, Shanker would need the vice presidency of NEA/AFT to retain his seat on the AFL-CIO Executive Council. Unquestionably retention of it would be a sine qua non of any merger agreement. Shanker is vice-president of the AFL-CIO, vice-chairman of its Executive Council, the chairman of the General Board of its Department of Professional Employers, and chairman of its International Affairs Committee. Shanker's enormous personal and professional stake in his AFL-CIO role is also evidenced by his longtime support of its policies, his avoidance of any public criticisms of them or its leaders, and his continual stroking of AFL-CIO causes and leaders in his weekly advertisement in the New York Times. These are only a small part of the evidence that merger is subordinate to affiliation with the AFL-CIO in Shanker's thinking. Furthermore, it would hardly make sense for NEA/AFT to be represented by a new person when it has available someone with real influence on the AFL-CIO Executive Council. Indeed, the pro-merger forces in the NEA can cite Shanker's role in the AFL-CIO to justify offering him the vice presidency of NEA/AFT. In any case, it is unthinkable that Shanker would agree to any arrangement that terminated or weakened his role in the AFL-CIO. To be fair about it, however, the AFT has an organizational claim here that is at least as strong as any NEA claim that the top executive officer of the NEA/AFT come from the ranks of the NEA.

There is a problem with this solution. The existing NEA constitution prohibits its executive officers from holding office for more than two consecutive three-year terms. The top three NEA officers were reelected to a second term in 1993. This means that they will no longer be eligible for reelection in 1996, just about the time the constitution of NEA/AFT may go into effect. NEA officers who are adversely affected by the limits on their reelection may try to eliminate them; officers and candidates for office who benefit from the term limits will contend that these term limits should carry over to the governance policies of the merged organization. In both cases the "principle" invoked will be a rationalization of the interests involved. Ultimately NEA leaders will abandon a principle that was adopted for short range reasons. Imagine a candidate for political office who runs on a platform calling for term limits, and then abandons the platform when the term limits would be applicable to the candidate as an officeholder. This is likely to be the picture in the NEA when the merger agreement is presented to its Representative Assembly for approval.

None of this fully answers the question of Shanker's role in NEA/AFT. Most NEA members feel that because the NEA is the much larger of the two unions, the president of the merged organization should come from the ranks of the NEA. Second, in view of the unclear governance structure of the new organization, it would be difficult for Shanker to organize support within the NEA, even assuming (which we do not) that his immediate objective is the presidency of NEA/AFT. Third, some of the forces within the NEA opposed to merger assert that their opposition is based on their antipathy to Shanker and to his anticipated role in the NEA/AFT. This attitude is probably confined to a small group in the NEA, but an overt power grab by Shanker at the outset would run a significant risk, even though he commands the respect of an influential leadership strata in the NEA.

In our opinion, the logic of the situation leads to the conclusion that Shanker will be the sole or 1st vice-president of NEA/AFT in its initial stages, so that he can remain on the AFL-CIO Executive Council and enhance his leadership position in the AFL-CIO. However, the vice-presidency of NEA/AFT will not solve the problem if NEA/AFT retains term limits on its executive officers. Eliminating the term limits for only the vice presidency would be difficult to defend; eliminating them for all the executive offices would upset a host of plans to run for these offices, and for the offices that would become open if their incumbents run for executive office. These interests are likely to clash with the logic of a Shanker presence on the AFL-CIO Executive Council. In any event, the interrelatedness of term limits on NEA/AFT executive offices and representation of the AFL-CIO Executive Council are sure to be important considerations in the merger talks.

e-mail (EPI@schoolreport.com)